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[Crim. No. 5996.

In Bank.

Apr. 30, 1957.)

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DONALD RICHARD
RANDAZZO, Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Remittitur-Recal1.-An order of an
appellate court recalling a remittitur and setting the appeal for
further hearing is an interlocutory order that does not establish the law of the case for further proceedings therein.
[2] Id.-Appeal- Remittitur - Recall.-Although the issues of
"'raud, mistake or madvertence on which the recall of a remittitur depend are distinct from the issues on the merits of
the appeal, they are usually so closely related thereto that the
court can determine them only by a review of its decision on
the merits.
[8] Id.-Appea.1-Remittitur-Recall.-Given the strong policy in
favor of finality of appellate judgments after the going down
of the remittitur and the fact that the court must be free to
review the grounds of its decision recalling the remittitur
properly to dispose of the merits, if it determines on further
consideration that the remittitur should not have been recalled,
it has the power to and must vacate its order of recall instead
of redeciding the case on the merits.
[4] Id.-Appea.1-Remittitur-Recall.-Where implicit in the District Court of Appeal's reversal of a judgment was its redetermination of the correctness of its recall of the remittitur,
and such issue is before the Supreme Court by virtue of its
order of transfer, the fact that the Supreme Court denied a
hearing following the order of recall is immaterial, since such

[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 678 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 10, 11] Criminal Law, § 1455; (6)
Indictment and Information, §§ 22, 28; [7] Indictment and Information, § 28; [8] Indictment and Information, § 37; [9] Kidnaping, § 6.
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denial of hearing constituted only an exercise of its discretionary power to transfer or refuse to transfer a cause to the
Supreme Court that is pending in a District Court of Appeal.
(Disapproying statellll'nt in Municipal Bond Co. v. City of Rivef'side,4 Cal.App.2d 442,445 [41 P.2d 215], that determination of
issues on an order reralling a remittitur becomes law of the
case.)
[5J Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-An error of law does not
authorize the recall of a remittitur.
[6J Indictment and Information-Charging Otfense.-An information is sufficient if it charges defendant with the commission of
a public offense in words sufficient to give him notice of the
offense of which he is accused (Pen. Code, § 952); only the
essential elements of the offense need be charged.
[7] Id. - Charging Offense. - N.otice of the particular manner,
means, place or circumstances of the offense charged is given,
not by detailed pleading, but by the transcript of the evidence
before the committing magistrate.
[8] Id.-Surplusage.-Surplusage does not vitiate an information
and may be rejected if enough remains to charge the offense.
[9] Kidnaping-Indictment and Information.-Those parts of a
count stating that defendant did "seize, confine, abduct, conceal" and "did hold and detain said [designated victim], with
intent and for the purpose of committing robbery" were not
ehargeable as public offenses under Pen. Code, § 209, defining
kidnaping for the purpose of robbery as amended in 1951, but
if these parts were omitted as surplusage the count would
still charge the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery
in violation of § 209 as amended and give defendant ample
notice of the offense of which he was accused; if the offense
was not stated with sufficient clarity to enable him to present
his defense, he should have demurred.
[10] Criminal Law-Appeal- Remittitur - Recall.-Defendant's
complaint that erroneous instructions were given would not
authorize the recall of a remittitur, since it is merely a complaint of an error of law and judicial error, and a remittitur
will not be recalled to correct judicial error or mistake of law;
any objection defendant had to the instructions should have
been raised on appeal from the judgment of conviction.
[11] Id.-Appeal-Remittitur-Recall.-Where the District Court
of Appeal shOUld have vacated its order recalling a remittitur
and not redecided the case on the merits, the correct disposition after granting a petition for hearing is for the Supreme
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, ):ndictment and Information, § 36 et aeq.;
Am.Jur., Indictment ,and Information, § 51 et seq.
[9] See CaJ..Jur.2d, Kidnaping, § 13.
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Court to return the proceeding to the District Court of Appeal
with appropriate directions to vacate the order recallingtbe
remittitur and to reissue the remittitur on its decision afIlrming the judgment.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Kenneth C. Newell and Benjamin J. Scheinmall, Judges. Proceedings transferred to District Oourt of
Appeal with directions.
Prosecution for robbery and kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery. Proceedings tra.ns.ferred to Distriet Court of Appeal with directions.
Morris Lavine for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Elisabeth lfiller,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information in
two counts, robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) in Count I and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. Oode, § 209) in
Count II, and was found by a jury to be guilty on both
counts as charged. The conviction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division
One, on March 29, 1955. (People V. Rand,o,zzo, 132 Ca1.App.
2d 20 [281 P.2d 289].) A petition for rehearing in the
District Court of Appeal was denied, a subsequent petition for
hearing in this court was also denied, and the remittitur issued
on April 29, 1955.
On May 10, 1956, defendantflled with the District Court
of Appeal a "Motion to Recall the Remittitur, Reinstate Appeal, and Consider Supplemental or Amended Petiti(\t. for
Rehearing. " This motion was granted as to Count II only
and the attorney general's petition for rehearing was denied.
The attorney general then petitioned for a hearing in this
court. Since the appeal was already set for hearing in the
District Court of Appeal, we denied the petition because of
our unwillingness to interfere until the District Oourt of
Appeal had come to a final decision.
On October 16, ;1.956, the District Court of Appeal issued
its order reversing the judgment of conviction as to Count
II, stating as its basis the same ground that it had used in
granting the motion to recall the remittitur, that "the opinion
of this court ••. affirming & conviction of 'life imprison.
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ment without possibility of parole' for the crime of kidnaping
'with intent and for the purpose of committing robbery,'
under Section 209 of the Penal Code, was erroneously predicated upon said statute as it existed prior to 1951, and prior
to defendant's alleged criminal acts, wbereas said statute, as
amended in 1951, does not make it an offense separate from
robbery, to bold or detain a person for the purpose of committing robbery .••. " A petition for rehearing in the District Court of Appeal was denied, and tbe case is now before
us after tbe granting of a petition for hearing in this eourt.
It is contended at the outset tbat the order of tbe District
Court of Appeal recalling its remittitur now constitutes a
final order reinstating tbe appeal and tbat tberefore, following the transfer of the cause, this court is precluded from
reviewing the order recalling tbe remittitur and must decide
tbe appeal on tbe merits. [1] We believe, however, tbat an
order of an appellate court recalling a remittitur and setting
the appeal for further hearing is an interlocutory order tbat
does not establisb the law of tbe case for furtber proceedings
therein. In this respect it is analogous to an order of a trial
court sustaining or overruling a demurrer to tbe complaint,
wbicb does not become binding on it. (Berri v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal.2d 856, 860 [279 P.2d 8], and cases cited.)
[2] Altbougb the issues of fraud, mistake, or inadvertence
on which the recall of a remittitur depend are distinct from
the issues on the merits of tbe appeal, tbey are usually so
closely related thereto that the court can determine tbem only
by a review of its decision on tbe merits. (See Southwestern
Inv. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Ca1.2d 623, 628-629 [241
P.2d 985) ; Isenberg v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 732 [7 P.2d
1006) ; Davis v. Basalt Rock Co., 114 Cal.App.2d 300, 304310 [250 P.2d 254]; Kahle v. Sinnett, 136 Ca1.App.2d 34,
38-40 [288 P.2d 139].) If the court was bound by its tentative decision that a fraud had been perpetrated upon it or
that it had been inadvertent or mistaken, it would be foreclosed from the full review of the case implicit in its order
for reconsideration. [3] Given the strong policy in favor
of finality of appellate judgments after the going down of
the remittitur, and the fact that the court must be free to
review the grounds of its decision recalling the remittitur
properly to dispose of the merits, we conclude that if it determines on further. consideration that the remittitur should
not have been recaJled, it has the power to and must vacate
its order of 1'(>call instead of redeciding the case on the merits.
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(See Southwestern Inv. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, supra,
38 Ca1.2d 623, 626; Chin Ott Wong v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,
91 Ca1.App.2d 1, 3 [204 P.2d 387] ; Ex parte Gallagher, 101
Cal. 113, 114 [35 P. 449}.) [4] Accordingly, implicit in the
District Court of Appeal's reversal of the judgment herein
was its redetermination of the correctness of its recall of the
remittitur, and that issue is now before this court by virtue
of our order of transfer. In this respect, the fact that we
denied a hearing following the order of recall is immaterial,
since our denial of hearing constituted only an exercise of our
discretionary power to transfer or refuse to transfer a cause
to this court that is pending in a District Court of Appeal.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4c.) Cases holding that an order
denying a motion to dismiss an appeal becomes the law of the
case (see George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Ca1.2d 834,
850-851 [205 P.2d 1037], and cases cited) are not inconsistent
with our conclusion herein, for in such cases the issues on the
motion and merits respectively are ordinarily distinct and the
policy in favor of finality of judgments is not involved. The
statement in Municipal Bond Co. v. City of Riverside, 4 Cal.
App.2d 442, 445 [41 P.2d 215), that the determination of
issues on an order recalling a remittitur becomes the law of
the case was not necessary to the decision therein and is disapproved.
The order of the District Court of Appeal granting the
motion to recall the remittitur as to Count II, ordering the
judgment on that count vacated and the remittitur recalled,
shows on its face that it was based on an error of law.
[5] It is settled that an error of law does not authorize the
recall of a remittitur. (Southwestern Inv. Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, 38 Ca1.2d 623, 626, and cases cited.)
Moreover, it is clear from its first opinion that the District
Court of Appeal reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence in
the light of the provisions of Penal Code, section 209, as they
read at the time the alleged crime was committed. Thus, both
defendant and the attorney general briefed the case with
reference to the code section as amended, and the District
Court of Appeal quoted defendant's contention that he was
not guilty of kidnaping to commit robbery "under Section
209, Penal Code, as amended in 1951," set forth the facts that
the victim was kidnaped after the service station was robbed,
and quoted with approval the argument in the attorney general's brief that defendant was guilty under section 209 as
amended on the gl"ound that

,/
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"'Vhere a kidnaping takes place after the actual perpetration of a robbery such kidnaping may be a kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery if it may reasonably be inferred that the
transportation of the victim was to effect the escape of the
robber or to remove the victim to another place where he might
less easily sound an alarm.
"'People v. Kristy, 4 Ca1.2d 504, 507-508 (50 P.2d 798).
"People v. Raucho, 8 Ca1.App.2d 655, 665-666 [47 P.2d
1108).
"People v. Bean, 88 Ca1.App.2d 34, 40-41 [198 P.2d 379]."
(132 Cal.App.2d at p. 24.)
Defendant contends that the judgment of conviction on
Count II was void and that he was denied due process of
law on the ground that he was convicted of an offense unknown to the law. In support of this contention he urges that
the information failed to state a public offense since it was
couched in the language of section 2D9 prior to its amendment"
in 1951 and that the jury was instructed according to the law
prior to the amendment.
At no time during the course of the appeal, in his brief
on appeal, or his petitions for rehearing and hearing, did defendant, who was then represented by the same counsel as he
is now, make any attack upon the information, nor did he
point out any inaccuracy or other impropriety of the instructions that he now complains of. He merely asserted, so far as
the instructions on kidnaping for the purpose of robbery
were concerned, that none should have been given on that
subject on the ground that the evidence would not support a
conviction of that crime. No explanation is offered for his
failure to raise these points during the appeal or before the
issuance of the remittitur, or for his delay for more than a year
after the remittitur issued in seeking to set it aside.
[6] An information is sufficient if it charges the defendant with the commission of a public offense in words
sufficient to give him notice of the offense of which he is accused. (Peop~e v. Roberts, 40 Ca1.2d 483, 486-487 [254 P.2d
501) ; Pen. Code, § 952.) Only the essential elements of the
offense need be charged. (People v. Britton, 6 Ca1.2d 1, 5 [56
P .2d 494 J.) [7] Notice of the particular manner, means,
place or circumstances of the offense is given, not by detailed
pleading, but by the transcript of the evidence before the committing magistrate. (People v. Pierce, 14 Ca1.2d 639, 646 [96
P.2d 784J.) [8] Surplusage, however, does not vitiate the
information 8l).d'may be rejected if enough remains to charge
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the offens('. (People v. Sfcclik, 187 Cal. 361, 371 [203 P. 78] ;
People Y. Walton, 70 Ca\App.2d Supp. 862, 865 [161 P.2d
498J, and cases cited.)
At the time the crime was committed Penal Code, section
209 provided: "Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles,
entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps, or carries away
any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold
or detain or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom,
re'Yard or to commit extortion or to exact from relatives or
friends of such person any money or valuable thing, or any
person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit
robbery, or any person who aids or abets any such act, is
guilty of a fclony and upon conviction thereof shall suffer
deatll or slla11 be punished by imprisonment in the state prison
for life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the
jur~' trying the same, in cases in which the person or persons
subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily harm I
or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for .
life with possibility of parole in cases where such person or
persons do not suffer bodily harm."
In Count II of the amended information it was charged
that" For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense of the same class of crimes and offenses as the
charge set forth in Count I hereof, the said DONALD RICHARD
RANDAZZO is accused by the District Attorney of and for the
County of Los Angeles, State of California, by this amended
information, of the crime of KIDNAPING FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ROBBERY, a felony, committed as follows: That the said DONALD
RICHARD RANDAZZO on or about the 14th day of September
1953, at and in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously seize, confine, abduct, conceal. kidnap and carry away Ed Hallmark,
an individual,with the intent to hold and detain, and who did
hold and detain, said Ed Hallmark, with intent and for the
purpose of committing robbery.
"That said Ed Hallmark so kidnaped was subjected to and
did suffer bodily harm by said DONALD RICHARD RANDAZZO."
[9] The part of the foregoing count that defendant did
"seize, confine, abduct, conceal" and "who did hold and detain said Ed Hallmark, with intent and for the purpose of
committing robbery," are not chargeable as public offenses
under Penal Code, section 209, as amended. If these parts
of the count are disr~garded as surplusage, however (People
T. 8teeZik, ""Fa, 187 Cal. 361, 371). Count II would still
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charge the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery
in violation of section ~09 as amended and give defendant
ample notice of the offense of which he was accused, for it
would then read: " .•. that the said DONALD RICHARD RANDAZZO on or about the 14th day of September, 1953, at and
in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, did will·
fully, unlawfully and feloniously . . . kidnap and carry away
Ed Hallmark, an individual, . . . with intent and for the
purpose of committing robbery." If the offense was not stated
with sufficient clarity to enable defendant to present his defense, he should have demurred on one or more of the grounds
set forth in Penal Code, section 1004. (People v. Schoeller,
96 Cal.App.2d 61, 62 [214 P.2d 565]; People v. WtJid, 127
Cal.App.2d 614, 616-617 [274 P.2d 217].)
[10] Defendant's complaint that erroneous instructions
were given would not authorize the recall of the remittitur.
for it is a complaint of an error of law and judicial error
only, and a remittitur will not be recalled to correct judicial
error or mistake of law. Any objection defendant had to the
instructions should bave been raised on his appeal from the
judgment of conviction. (People v. WhittOn, 112 Cal. App.
2d 328,332 [246 P.2d 60].)
[11] It follows from the foregoing that the District Court
of Appeal should have vacated its order recalling the remittitur and not redecided the case on the merits. Since the
motion to recall the remittitur was made to the District Court
of Appeal, however, the correct disposition after granting
the petition for hearing is to return the proceeding to that
court with appropriate directions. (Southwestern Inv. Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, supra. 38 Ca1.2d 623, 630.) A{'cordingly, the cause is transferred to the District Court of Ap·
peal, Second Appellate District, Division One, with directions
to file its order vacating its order recalling the remittitur and
to reissue the remittitur on its decision affirming the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
conclusion of the majority that the jUdgment as to Count II
should be affirmed. However, I am convinced that the judgment of affirmance should be rendered by this {'ourt and
not by the Distrirt Court of Appeal upon remand with directions or otherwis}~,; and I agree with the discussion, and
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conclusions of Mr. Justice Carter on this point in his dissenting opinion. I wish to emphasize the confusion which in
my opinion the prevailing opinion has injected into the practice and procedure in situations of this sort and that in this
respect tbe opinion is not constitutionally sound.
It is noted that the defendant was charged by information
in two counts, robbery in Count I and kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery in Count II. He was convicted on both
counts and separate sentences were pronounced. On appeal
to the District Court of Appeal the judgment as to both counts
was affirmed. A petition for rehearing in that court was
denied and a petition for bearing in this court was denied.
The defendant moved the District Court of Appeal to recall
the remittitur as to Count II only on the ground that the
judgment on that count was void; that it had been improvidently made upon an innocent false suggestion; that it h88
been based on a mistake of fact; that it had been made
through inadvertence on the part of tbe court and counsel,
and that it had resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The
motion was granted and the remittitur was recalled as to
Count II. The appeal as to that count was reinstated and
was set down for rehearing. Tbe judgment on Count I became final. The attorney general filed a petition for hearing
in this court following the order recalling the remittitur.
That petition was denied. The appeal as to Count II was
reconsidered by the District Court of Appeal and the judgment as to that count was reversed. A petition for a hearing
as to that judgment was granted and the cause was thereby
transferred to this court.
It may not be denied that the District Court of Appeal
had jurisdiction to entertain the motion to recall the remittitur. It is also beyond question that the motion was a
"cause" as contemplated by the Constitution and was subject
to transfer to this court on petition for hearing. This court
entertained such a petition and denied it. The power of each
court to act in each instance was present and when this
court denied the petition for hearing the question of the
propriety of the order of recall was settled and became either
the law of the case or res judicata. Thereafter the appeal
as to Count II was before t11e District Court of Appeal the
same as if no judgment had been rendered by that court
therein and as if n<1 remittitur had issued. Thereafter that
court reversed the jUdgment based on Count II. When this

)
Apr. 1957)

PEOPLE t1. RANDAZZO

493

[48 C.2d 484; 310 P.2d '13]

-)

)

court granted a hearing the judgment of the District Court
of Appeal was thereby set aside and the appeal was pending
in this court the same as on original appeal and sllbject to
disposition as such. Whatever occurred in the District Court
of Appeal on the motion to recall the remittitur had been
finally settled and this court should now deter~ine the appeal
on its merits.
If the petition for hearing after the decision of the District Court of Appeal in recalling the remittitur had been
granted the disposition of that matter might have taken the
course followed in Southwestern Inv. Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 38 Ca1.2d 623 [241 P ;2d 985]. But such is not this
case. When this court denied the petition to review the order
of the District Court of Appeal in recalling the remittitur
the question whether the order of recall was rightly or wrongly
granted faded from the case and was no longer subject to
reconsideration. Notwithstanding that fact the majority now
directs the District Court of Appeal to vacate its order recalling the remittitur, to reinstate its original judgment and
to affirm the judgment of the trial court.
It should be remembered that this court has no appellate
jurisdiction as such over the judgments of the District Courts
of Appeal. The method of review is by petition for hearing.
In the absence of an order of transfer to this c9urt pursuant
thereto, those judgments become final by operation of law.
When an order of transfer is entered the appeal is then
pending not in the District Court of Appeal but in this
court for determination. The majority opinion states that
the District Court of Appeal "lost jurisdiction" of the appeal
upon the issuance of the remittitur and was without jurisdiction to recall it. That question was inherent in the petition for hearing in this court to set aside the order recalling
the remittitur and has long since become final. It is not a
matter for review on the appeal from the judgment, which
is the only matter now before us.
Further confusion is infused into the law by calling the
order of the District Court of Appeal in recalling the remittitur an "interlocutory order." Such an order is one
that imports a lack of finality in the disposition of the matter
involved. Here the question of the finality of the order of
recall became final and the order can in no sense be deemed
"interlocutory." That term has a well known and definite
meaning, usually pFovided for by statute, and has no application to a final disposition of the appeal now before UL

I!

I
!

I

494

PEOPLE tI. RANDAZZO

[48 C.2d

On the merits the record supports the judgment and it
should be affirmed by order of this court.
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion is predicated npon the theory that
the recall of a remittitur by an appellate court is a mere
interlocutory order and is analogous to an order of a trial
court sustaining or overruling a demurrer to a complaint.
In this connection it cites and relies upon Berri v. Superior
Court, 43 Cal.2d 856 [279 P.2d 8], which holds that an order
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not a final
order and may be changed by the court at any time before
judgment is entered in accordance therewith. The holding
of the majority in this respect is clearly unsound as it fails
to give consideration to the basic problems involved in a
proceeding for the recall of a remittitur. It has been repeatedly held that when a remittitur is issued and filed in
the court below, the appellate court loses jurisdiction of
the cause and thereafter has no power to modify or change
its decision or judgment unless and until the remittitur is
recalled and its jurisdiction is restored. This court has recently reannounced the rule as to when and upon what conditions a remittitur may be recalled. In Southwestern Inv.
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623 [24] P.2d 985],
this court stated at page 626: "That a remittitur may be
recalled on the reviewing court's own motion, on motion or
petition after notice supported by affidavits, or on stipulation
setting forth the facts which will justify the granting of
the order is now determined by rule. (Rule 25(d), Rules on
Appeal; 36 Ca1.2d at p. 22.) The question as to when the
facts constitute grounds for the granting of the motion is
resolved by the case law. Other than for the correction of
clerical errors, the recall may be ordered on the ground of
fraud, mistake or inadvertence. The recall may not be granted
to correct judicial error." Recent decisions of the District
Courts of Appeal are to the same effect (Davis v. Basalt
Rock Co., 114 Cal.App.2d 300 [250 P.2d 254]; Kahle v.
Sinnett, 136 Cal.App.2d 34 [288 P.2d 139]). Therefore.
having in mind that as a general rule an appellate court
cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a canse in which the
remittitur has been issued by its order and filed in the court

)
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below, and that the office of the remittitur is to return the
proceedings which have been brought up by appeal to the
court below, and when the remittitur has been duly filed,
the proceedings from that time are pending in the trial court
and not in the appellate court, and that as to such proceedings it is not competent for the appellate court to make
any further order until the remittitur is recalled by it (Kohle
v. Sinnett, supra), it should be apparent that an order
granting a motion for the recall of a remittitur issued by
an appellate court is something more than a mere interlocutory order such as an order sustaining or overruling a
demurrer. This must be the situation because, until such an
order is made, the appellate court is without jurisdiction to
act in the case (Chin Ott Wong v. Title Ins. ill Trust Co.,
91 Cal.App.2d 1 [204 P.2d 387]). It must necessarily follow,
therefore, that when an order is made by an appellate court
recalling a remittitur issued by it, the effect of such order
is to restore jurisdiction of the cause in that court. True,
it may have erroneously granted such order, but if so, the
error would be one committed within the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and when such an order becomes final, it is not
subject to collateral attack. In this respect, an order made
by an appellate court recalling a remittitur is analogous to
an order made by such a court denying a motion to dismiss
an appeal (George v. Bekins Van &- Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d
834 [205 P .2d 1037)). Either of them may be based on facts
outside of the record. Following either the court must make
its decision on the merits of the case on appeal.
The majority erroneously assumes that the issues which
may be involved on a motion for the recall of a remittitur
are usually so closely related to the issues on the merits of
the appeal that the court can determine them only by a
review of its decision on the merits. There is no basis in
either law or fact for this assumption. On the other hand,
let us assume that in support of a motion to recall a remittitur issued by a District Court of Appeal the moving
party made out a clear case of extrinsic fraud by a showing
that he was falsely induced by the adverse party to absent
himself from the hearing before the District Court of Appeal
and that the adverse party falsely represented to the District Court of Appeal that the moying party waived any
right to a decision in his favor by the appellate court and
the appellate court' acted upon sneh misrepresentation to
the detriment of the moving party who did not learn of the
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deception and fraud until after the issuance of the remittitur.
Assume that upon such showing the District Court of Appeal
recalled and set aside its remittitur and this court thereafter
denied a petition for hearing of the cause and the order
granting the motion to recall and set aside the remittitur
became final. Would this court hold in such a case that
on petition for hearing after the District Court of Appeal
had rendered its decision on the merits that its prior decision
recalling and setting aside the remittitur could then be reviewed by this court? I have grave doubt that it would so
hold, but under the holding in the majority opinion in this
case, the order of an appellate court recalling a remittitur,
even in the circumstances above recited, could be set aside
by this court at any time regardless of the period of time
which had elapsed since the remittitur was recalled.
The majority cites and relies upon Southwestern Inv. Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal.2d 623 [241 P.2d 985] ; Isenberg
v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722 [7 P.2d 1006]; Davis v. Basalt
Rock 00., 114 Cal.App.2d 300 [250 P.2d 254]; Kohle v.
Sinnett, 136 Cal.App.2d 34 [288 P.2d 139]. But in none of
these cases had the order recalling the remittitur become
final as it had in the case at bar; that is, in every one of
the last cited cases this court granted a hearing and transferred the cause from the District Court of Appeal to this
court before the order made by the District Court of Appeal
recalling the remittitur had become final, and this court, therefore, had before it the cause in which the order was made
granting the recall. Such being the case, there was no collateral attack upon the order recalling the remittitur as this
court had the same power to review the order recalling the
remittitur as the District Court of Appeal had when it
heard the motion and made the order in the first instance.
Such is not the situation here as the record discloses that
on July 11, 1956, the District Court of Appeal rendered a
decision in which it ordered that tIle remittitur be recalled.
That decision is as follows: "It appearing from the record
that the opinion of this court, filed March 29, 1955, affirming
a conviction of 'life imprisonment without possibility of
parole' for the crime of kidnapping 'with intent and for the
purpose of committing robbery,' under section 209 of the
Penal Code, was erroneously predicated upon said statute as
it existed prior to 1951, prior to defendant's alleged criminal
acts, in which year it was amended, whereas said statute, as
amended in 1951, dpeS not make it an offense separate from
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robbery, to hold or detain a person for the purpose of committing robbery, good cause appearing, it is ordered that
appellant's motion to recall the remittitur as to Count II
is granted and it is ordered that the judgment heretofore
entered (on March 29, 1955) as. to said Count II is vacated
and set aside and the remittitur issued thereon (April 29.
1955) is recalled.
"The appeal as to said Count II is ordered on calendar
August 28, 1956, at 10 a. m., for consideration of an amended
petition for rehearing as to the affirmance of the judgment
rendered on said Count II." (143 Cal.App.2d 59 at page 60
[299 P.2d 307].)
It will be recalled that this court denied the petition of
the attorney general to grant a hearing and review said decision on August 8, 1956. Such denial had the effect of
rendering the order recalling the remittitur a final judgment
of the District Court of Appeal which should now be binding
upon this court.
In this respect the majority opinion states: "We believe,
however, that an order of an appellate court recalling a remittitur and setting the appeal for further hearing is an
interlocutory order that does not establish the law of the
case for further proceedings therein." No authority is cited
in support of this statement, and the only decided case on
this subject is to the contrary. (See Municipal Bond Co. v.
City of Riverside, 4 Ca1.App.2d 442 [41 P.2d 215).) The
majority opinion purports to disapprove the holding in this
case.
In my opinion the order of the District Court of Appeal
in recalling its remittitur here is res judicata and may not
now be reexamined by this court. The case, however, is
properly before this eonrt on the merits as it was transferred
to this court by an order granting a hearing on November
14, 1956, after the decision of the District Court of Appeal
rendered on the merits on October 16, 1956, as follows: "It
appearing that the opinion of this court, filed March 29.
1955, affirming a conviction of 'life imprisonment without
possibility of parole' for the crime of kidnapping 'with intent and for the purpose of committing robbery,' under section 209 of the Penal Code, was erroneusly predicated upon
said statute as it existed prior to 1951, and prior to defendant's alleged criminal acts, whereas said statute, as
amended in 1951, does not make it an offense separate from
robbery, to hold or detain a person for the purpose of com-
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mitting robbery, and the remittitur in said case having been
recalled as to Count II by order of this court filed on July
11, 1956 and the judgment as to Count II having been vacated
by said order, and the matter now being submitted for decision,
"It is hereby ordered, good cause appearing therefor, that
the judgment appealed from, in respect to Count II, is hereby
reversed." «Cal.App.) 302 P.2d 39.)
I agree with this decision and I find no answer to it in
the majority opinion.
In conclusion I wish to point out that the provision for
transfer of causes from a District Court of Appeal to this
court is stated in the Constitution.- The term "cause" is
broad and includes any and all orders. It is said in In r6
Wells, 174 Cal. 467, 471 [163 P. 657]: "The particular
clause involved here is that which gives the supreme court
power 'to order any cause pending before a district court
of appeal to be heard and determined by the supreme court.'
The contention is that the matter before the district court
was not a 'cause' within the meaning of that word as used
in the above-quoted clause of the section.
" . . . This provision has always been understood to apply
to all cases, matters, and proceedings of every description.
It has been the unvarying custom of the court in Bank to
entertain an application for rehearing of any matter decided
in department, regardless of its nature or character. The
rule has been applied in original proceedings of all kinds,
in motions to dismiss appeals and other matters, as well as
in ordinary cases on appeal. The word 'cause,' in the clause
above quoted, was understood to be broad enough to include
everything that could possibly come before the department
for decision.
". . . To describe the decisions subject to this power the

)

·"The Supreme Court shall have power to order any cause pending
before the Supreme Court to be heard and determined by a district
court of appeal, and to order any cause pending before a district court
of appeal to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court. The order
last mentioned may be made before judgment has been pronounced
by a district court of appeal, or within 15 days in criminal ('ases, or
30 days in all other cases, after such judgment shall have become final
therein. The judgment of the district courts of appeal shall become
final therein upon the expiration of 15 days in criminal cases, or 30
days in all other cases, after the same shall have been pronounced.
"The Supreme Court shall have power to order causes pending before
a district court of appeal for one district to be transferred to the
district court of appeal for another district, or from one di'l'i~ion
thereof to another, 'for hearine and decision." (Cal. Const., art. VI,
~

)
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word 'cause' was selected. This was the word used in the
clause of section 2 giving similar power over the department
decisions, which, in that clause, as we have said, has been
understood to apply to every matter that could be decided
by a department. The familiar rule of construction requires
that it be given a similarly broad meaning in the new provision, and to include every matter decided by a district
court of appeal, and operating as a final decision or disposition thereof in that court. It is clear, therefore, that the
power to transfer causes from the district court of appeal, to
the supreme court, either before or after judgment in the
district eourt of appeal, was intended to have this all-embracing application." (Emphasis added.)
From the foregoing discussion in the Wells case it seems
clear that a motion to recall a remittitur in a District Court
of Appeal is a cause within the purview of the above cited.
constitutional provision, and, therefore, when the District
Court of Appeal rendered its decision on July 11, 1956, in
which it "ordered that appellant's motion to recall the remittitur as to Count II is granted and it is ordered that the
judgment heretofore entered (on March 29, 1955) as to said
Count II is vacated and set aside and the remittitur issued
thereon (April 29, 1955) is recalled," it decided a cause
pending in that court. Its decision in said cause became final
30 days thereafter (under the former rule) unless an order
was made by this court within that time transferring said
cause to this court. Since no such order was made by this
court, the decision of the District Court of Appeal in said
cause became final and, like a decision of that court on a
motion to dismiss an appeal, was not thereafter subject to
review by this court.
For the reasons above stated I would reverse the judgment
as to Count II of the information.

